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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
)
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, )
)
Plaintiff and Respondent, )
)
. V. )
)JASON MICHAEL BALCOM, )
)
Defendant and Petitioner. )
)
PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
On Appeal From the Judgment of the Superior Court 
of the State of California, County of Orange 
The Honorable Leonard H. McBride, Judge
Review of the Decision of the Court of Appeal, 
Fourth District, Division Three
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary statement
Mr. Balcom was tried for violations of the following 
sections of the California Penal Code: section 261(2) (Rape 
by Force), section 459/460.1 (Burglary First Degree), 
section 211/212.5(a) (Robbery First Degree), and section 
12022.3(a) (Use of a Firearm). (C.T. 37).
At trial, defense counsel successfully moved to exclude 
evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction. (C.T. 52). 
The court ruled that the People could only use the sanitized 
version of the prior conviction for the purpose of 
impeachment (i.e., "Have you ever been convicted of a felony 
involving theft?”). (C.T. 54). The jury concluded that Mr.
1
Balcom was guilty of robbery* (C.T. 142). However, it 
deadlocked on the issues of rape and use of a firearm (C.T. 
146-47) and the court declared a mistrial (C.T. 154).
— At retrial, defense counsel again moved to exclude 
evidence of the prior rape conviction. (C.T. 157).
However, this time the court admitted the evidence in 
rebuttal. fid.) . The jury found Mr. Balcom guilty of both 
rape and use of a firearm. (C.T. 229-30). The Court of 
Appeal affirmed. People v. Balcom, 1 Cal. App. 4th 354 
(1991). This Court granted review.
Statement of Facts 
A. NS. B.'s Testimony:
According to Denise B., the prosecutrix, at 
approximately one a.m. on July 24, 1988, Jason Balcom, the 
defendant, forced his way into her apartment. (R.T. 762- 
75) . Ms. B. claimed that Mr.. Balcom was carrying a rifle 
and that he was wearing jeans, a T-shirt, and a black 
baseball cap. (R.T. 773-78). She stated that Mr. Balcom 
tied her up, gagged her, and raped her. (R.T. 782-85) . She 
also stated that Mr. Balcom took her ATM card and her car 
keys. (R.T. 787-92). She later discovered her car missing, 
but she testified that she could not remember whether she 
told Mr. Balcom exactly where her car was parked. (R.T. 
792). Ms. B. also claimed that she had never met Mr. Balcom 
before the night in question, (R.T. 764-71).
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B. Mr. Balcom'8 Tastiaony:
Mr. Balcom's testimony was entirely different than Ms. 
B.'s. He testified that he met Ms, B. prior to the day of 
ttre alleged incident, went to her apartment on three- 
occasions, and once escorted her to her car. (R.T. 1110- 
25) . According to Mr. Balcom's testimony, he went to Ms. 
B.'s apartment on the night in question in order to collect 
some money her roommate owed him. (R.T. 1127-29) . Ms. B. 
invited him in and told him that her roommate would be back 
soon. (R.T. 1129-30). Their conversation became intimate 
and "led to" Ms. B.'s bedroom where they engaged in 
consensual sexual intercourse. (R.T. 1130-40). Afterwards, 
Ms. B. informed him that in fact her roommate was not coming 
home soon and he had no intention of paying Mr. Balcom.
(R.T. 1131).
Mr. Balcom testified that he became upset and took Ms.
B. 's ATM card because he thought that she and her roommate 
were "in [it] together." (R.T. 1114-33). He took some 
belts from her closet and tied her wrists and ankles. (R.T.
1134) . He also testified that because Ms. B, threatened to 
yell "rape," he found some bandannas and gagged her. (R.T.
1135) . Mr. Balcom denied that he raped her. (R.T. 1140).
C. Other Witnesses' Testimony:
Mary Vivian Ray, a security guard at Ms. B.'s apartment 
complex, testified that prior to the day of the alleged 
incident she had seen Mr. Balcom in the complex and she had
3
even seen Mr. Balcom enter Ms. B.'s apartment. (R.T. 1042- 
46) . She also testified that it would have been impossible 
to locate Ms. B.'s car without being told exactly where it 
wae- parked because there are so many parking stalls is the 
complex and there is no correlation between a tenant's 
apartment number and parking stall. (R.T. 1040-41). Mr. 
Hariri, the property manager, also testified that when he 
asked Ms, B. how her alleged attacker located her car, she 
said "I don't know." (R.T. 1072).
The prosecution attempted to corroborate Ms. B.'s claim 
that Mr. Balcom had a gun by introducing the testimony of 
Michael Baker, a witness who was in the apartment complex on 
the night in question. (R.T. 1007). Mr. Baker stated that 
around 2 a.m. that night he saw a black man in the complex 
carrying a long object covered by a towel. (R.T. 1007-10). 
He said he thought that the long object resembled a gun. 
(R.T. 1012) . Mr. Baker also testified that he never saw 
this black man's face and that he could not even determine 
whether the man had dark black skin or light black skin. 
(R.T- 1014, 1017). In addition, Mr. Baker testified that 
the man carrying the long object was wearing a sweatshirt 
(R.T. 1018) while Ms. B. testified that Mr. Balcom was 
wearing a T-shirt (R.T. 777). Ms. Ray also testified that 
there were always many people coming and going in the 
apartment complex between 7 p.m. and 2 a.m. (R.T. 1035-38).
At trial, over defense counsel's objection, evidence
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was also introduced of the fact that Mr. Balcom pled guilty 
to raping Theresa H. in Michigan. (R.T. 1111). The 
prosecution called Ms. H. to testify regarding this prior 
offense. Ms. H. stated that Mr. Balcom held a gun to-her 
head, took control of her car, drove her to an isolated 
location, raped her, stole her ATM card, and stole her car. 
(R-T. 1183-92).
Finally, four women who knew Mr. Balcom well and were 
aware of his prior conviction, testified that he was not 
sexually aggressive and that they did not believe that he 
would force Ms. B. to have sex. (R.T. 1213-26). After 
hearing all of the evidence, the jury found Mr. Balcom 
guilty of rape. (C.T. 229-30).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I. Did the trial court err under section 1101 of the 
California Evidence Code by admitting evidence of Mr. 
Balcom's prior rape conviction to show his "intent" and 
a "common scheme or plan" where his only defense was 
actual consent?
II. Even if evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction 
was not completely barred by section 1101, did the 
trial court err under section 352 of the California 
Evidence Code by admitting the live, detailed, 
emotional testimony of the victim of Mr. Balcom's prior 
offense?
III. Assuming that the trial court erred in admitting 
evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction, did 
this improper admission constitute reversible error?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court improperly admitted evidence of Mr. 
Balcom's prior rape conviction to show his intent to commit 
the charged rape and to show a common scheme or planT Under 
section 1101 of the California Evidence Code, evidence of a 
prior conviction is not admissible to show a defendant's 
criminal disposition, and may be allowed only if it is 
relevant to prove a material fact in dispute. In this case, 
Mr. Balcom merely asserted ’the defense of actual consent and 
therefore did not place either his intent or his identity in 
dispute. Furthermore, the evidence was not relevant to show 
* a common scheme or plan because the charged offense was 
vastly dissimilar from the uncharged offense and was not an 
integral part of a grand scheme.
In addition, even if the evidence was not completely 
barred by section 1101, under section 352 of the California 
Evidence Code the evidence should have been excluded because 
its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any possible 
probative value it may have had. Evidence of Mr. Balcom's 
prior rape conviction had no substantial probative value.
Yet it was highly inflammatory and severely prejudicial. 
Therefore, the trial court erred in admitting the evidence.
Finally, the trial court's erroneous admission was 
reversible error. This was a close case. Had the trial 
court not erroneously admitted the evidence, it is 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to Mr.
6
Balcom would have been reached. Therefore, the decision of 
the lower court must be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OP THE 
PRIOR RAPE CONVICTION BECAUSE SUCH EVIDENCE WAS NOT 
RELEVANT TO A MATERIAL ISSUE IN DISPUTE AND COULD ONLY 
SHOW MR. BALCOM'S CRIMINAL DISPOSITION.
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of Mr.
Balcom's Michigan rape conviction^ because evidence of a
defendant's character is inadmissible when offered to prove
a defendant's conduct on a particular occasion. Cal. Evid.
Code sec. 1101(a).^ Evidence of an uncharged offense may
not be admitted to show either a defendant's criminal
disposition or a defendant's propensity to commit the
charged offense. People v, Kellev. 66 Cal. 2d 232, 238
(1967). Evidence of a prior conviction is admissible only
if it is relevant to prove a material fact in dispute. Cal.
Evid. Code sec. 1101(b).^
^The Michigan rape occurred after the alleged incident. 
Subsequent offenses, however, are treated the same as prior 
offenses in determining admissibility. lA Wigmore,’ Evidence sec. 
58.2, at 1346 (Tiller's Rev. 1983).
^California Evidence Code section lioi(a) provides in 
pertinent part; "[E]vidence of a person's character or a trait 
of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, 
evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his 
or her conduct) is inadmissible when offered to prove his or her 
conduct on a specified occasion.**
^California Evidence Code section 1101(b) provides:
"Nothing in this section prohibits the admission of evidence that 
a person committed a crime, civil \/rong, or other act when 
relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent.
7
The trial court improperly admitted evidence of Mr. 
Balcom's prior rape conviction to show his intent and a 
common scheme or plan because such evidence was not relevant 
t^the only material issue of whether Ms. B. consented to 
sexual intercourse. In determining the admissibility of 
evidence of prior crimes three factors must be considered:
"(1) the materiality of the fact sought to be proved or 
disproved; (2) the tendency of the uncharged crime to prove 
or disprove the material fact; and (3) the existence of any 
rule or policy requiring the exclusion of relevant 
evidence." People v. Thompson^ 27 Cal. 3d 303, 315 (1980).
A. Evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction
was improperly admitted because his "intent” and
“identity" were not In dispute and the evidence
was not material to the only disputed fact of
whether Ms. B. consented to sexual intercourse.
Evidence is material if it is "offered upon an issue 
which will ultimately prove to be material to the People's 
case." People v. Schader. 71 Cal. 2d 761, 774 (1969). The 
evidence must be offered to prove either an ultimate fact or 
an intermediate fact from which an ultimate fact may be 
inferred. Thompson. 27 Cal. 3d at 315. intermediate facts 
include motive, opportunity, scheme, and modus operandi.
Id. at 315, n.l4. However, evidence offered to prove an 
intermediate fact does not necessarily imply its
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or 
accident, or whether a defendant in a prosecution for an unlawful 
sexual act or attempted unlawful sexual act did not reasonably 
and in good faith believe that the victim consented) other than 
his or her disposition to commit such an act."
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materiality. Id. The intermediate fact must "tend[] 
logically and by reasonable inference, to establish any 
[ultimate fact in dispute] ... or to overcome any material 
m2ttter sought to be proved by the defense.” People v-.- 
Peete. 28 Cal. 2d 306, 315 (1946); see also Thompson/ 27 
Cal. 3d at 315, n.l4.
Thus, evidence is material only if introduced to prove 
an ultimate fact "actually in dispute.” Thompson. 27 Cal.
3d at 315. If the ultimate fact which the prosecution is 
attempting to prove has not been placed in dispute, the 
evidence of prior uncharged acts relating to such an 
ultimate fact is inadmissible. Id. Furthermore, a not 
guilty plea alone does not place any element of the crime of 
rape in issue. People v. Schader. 71 Cal. 2d 761, 775-76, 
n.l3 (1969).
1* Evidence of the prior rape conviction was
inadmissible to prove whether Mr. Balcom had 
the intent to commit forcible rape because 
his assertion of the defense of actual 
consent did not place his state of mind in 
dispute.
Evidence of uncharged criminal acts cannot be admitted 
to show the defendant's intent to commit rape where his 
intent to have intercourse is unambiguous and his defense is 
that the prosecuting witness consented to sex. Prior 
uncharged offenses are only admissible to prove intent if 
the defendant has placed his state of mind in issue. People 
v. Thomas. 20 Cal. 3d 457, 467 (1978). In a rape 
prosecution, the defendant only places his state of mind in
9
issue when he admits the act of sexual intercourse occurred 
but he denies having the necessary intent because of a 
mistake of fact or accident. Kellev, 66 Cal. 2d at 243.
— In the present case, the trial court admitted the 
evidence of the Michigan rape conviction to prove Mr. 
Balcom's intent to commit forcible rape. However, evidence 
offered to prove intent was immaterial because Mr. Balcom's 
intent was not "actually in dispute." Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d 
at 315. At trial, Mr. Balcom relied solely on the defense 
of actual consent and therefore did not place his intent in 
dispute. He admitted that he was the person who engaged in 
sexual intercourse with Ms. B. and that he intended to have 
sex with her.
This Court has concluded that when a defendant asserts 
the defense of actual consent, "there is nothing equivocal 
or ambiguous about defendant's intent." People v. Tassell> 
36 Cal. 3d 77, 88, n.7 (1984). In Tassell, the defendant 
presented an entirely different story than the prosecuting 
witness. The Court stated that, "Whichever version of
the facts is believed, defendant intended intercourse. On 
his evidence, [the prosecuting witness] consented. On hers, 
he accomplished the intended act against her will by use of 
force and threats." Id.
In accordance with Tassell. the Court of Appeal for the 
Second District held that if the defendant presents no 
evidence of an ambiguous intent, evidence of prior crimes
10
may not be admitted in regard to the issue of intent.
People V Nottingham. 172 Cal. App. 3d 484, 498 (1985). 
Nottingham also stated that "Tassell raises questions as to 
when, if ever, prior sex offenses perpetrated against other 
victims may be used to show a defendant's intent.*' Id. at 
497, n.l (emphasis added).
Following Tassell and Nottingham, the Court of Appeal 
for the First District concluded that, "When asserting the 
defense of [actual] consent, the defendant focuses on the 
victim's state of mind alone. The defense may entail no 
more than the assertion that the complaining witness lied 
about the events that took place." People v. Bruce, 208 
Cal. App. 3d 1099, 1104 (1989). When the defendant 
testifies that the prosecuting witness actually consented to 
intercourse, the jury roust weigh the evidence and determine 
whether the prosecuting witness or the defendant is telling 
the truth. People v. Romero. 171 Cal. App. 3d 1149, 1155 
(1985). If the jury returns a verdict for the defendant it 
has chosen to believe the defendant's testimony and has 
decided that the prosecuting witness consented to 
intercourse. Id. On the other hand, if the jury returns a 
guilty verdict it has determined that the prosecuting 
witness's story is credible and that nonconsensual 
intercourse occurred. Id. in determining whether the 
prosecuting witness consented to intercourse, the jury never 
looks at the defendant's state of mind because the defendant
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has admitted that he intended to engage in intercourse by 
the defense of actual consent.
In accordance with Bruce and Romero. the Court of 
Ap^al for the Fourth District stated that, '*[W]hen consent 
is raised as a defense there is no new issue of the 
defendant's subjective intent; the defense only disputes the 
state of mind of the prosecuting witness, not the 
defendant." People v. Key. 153 Cal. App. 3d 888, 895 
(1984). Thus, when asserting the actual consent defense the 
defendant challenges the prosecuting witness's credibility 
and presents no evidence of his state of mind. Id. at 898.
The defense of actual consent must not be confused with 
the defense of reasonable belief of consent; they are two 
separate and distinct defenses. Romero. 171 Cal. App. 3d at 
1154, Contrary to the actual consent defense, the 
reasonable belief of consent defense focuses on the 
defendant's state of mind. Id. at 1156. The jury first 
considers the prosecuting witness's state of mind. If the 
jury determines that the prosecuting witness did not 
consent, it will then consider whether the defendant could 
have reasonably believed she consented. Id. Thus, when the 
defendant asserts the reasonable belief of consent defense - 
the jury must look at-the defendant's state of mind to 
determine whether he was misled and entertained a reasonable 
belief of consent. Id.
Although the actual consent defense and the reasonable
12
belief of consent defense may be raised simultaneously,
”[t]he mere offer of the defense of [actual] consent clearly 
is not synonymous with substantial evidence of mistake of 
fzrot." People V. Burnham. 176 Cal. App. 3d 1134, 1147 
(1986) In the present case, the trial judge confused the 
defense of actual consent and the defense of reasonable 
belief of consent. Mr. Balcom relied solely on the defense 
of actual consent and did not testify that Ms. B.'s actions 
were either misleading or equivocal. Mr. Balcom's testimony 
has only one interpretation—that Ms. B. unequivocally 
consented to sex. Absolutely no evidence of equivocal 
conduct on the part of Ms. B. was presented at trial that 
could have been misinterpreted so as to justify a reasonable 
belief of consent jury instruction. In fact, the trial 
court's reasonable belief of consent instruction was 
misplaced because Mr. Balcom relied solely on the defense of 
actual consent which did not place his state of mind in 
issue.
In addition, evidence of prior offenses may not be 
admitted solely to corroborate the prosecuting witness's 
testimony unless it has some bearing on a contested issue. 
PAnple v. Thomas. 20 Cal. 3d 457, 468 (1978). Therefore, 
evidence of the prior rape was inadmissible to corroborate
^Both Burnham and Romero emphasize the distinction between 
the actual consent defense and the reasonable belief of consent 
defense. People v. Williams, 232 Cal. App. 3d 604 (1991), which 
also addresses the distinction between these two defenses, has 
been granted review by this Court.
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Ms. B.'s testimony in which she claimed that she was forced 
to engage in sexual intercourse against her will.
Otherwise, the general rule excluding evidence of prior 
offenses would be significantly undermined because such 
evidence could simply be introduced to corroborate the 
prosecuting witness without having any bearing on a 
contested issue. Id. at 468-69.
The only ultimate fact in issue in this case was 
whether Ms. B. consented to sexual intercourse. Because Mr. 
Balcom did not place his state of mind in dispute by his 
assertion of actual consent, the trial court erred in 
admitting evidence of the Michigan offense in order to prove 
Mr. Balcom's intent.
2. Evidence of the prior rape conviction was
inadmissible to show a common scheme or plan 
because the issues of Mr. Balcom's "intent" 
and "Identity" were not in dispute*
Evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction was 
improperly admitted under the common scheme or plan theory. 
Evidence of a prior offense can be admitted to show a common 
scheme or plan only if it has a bearing on a disputed issue. 
The rule that "prior sex offenses against other victims may 
be admitted ... to show a common plan, scheme or design 
without further examination of their bearing on intent, 
identity or other disputed issues has been overruled." 
Nottingham. 172 Cal. App. 3d at 499, n.2. This Court in 
Tassell recognized that the common scheme or plan exception 
is a "subordinate objective of proof, whose relevance
14
depends on some other actual issue, such as mistaken
identity or innocent intent,” Tassell, 36 Cal. 3d at 84.
The Court concluded that:
— [T]here being no issue of identity, it is __
immaterial whether the modus operand! of the 
charged crime was similar to that of the uncharged 
offenses. While the People rely on the 'common 
plan or scheme' rationale for admissibility, under 
the circumstances that is merely a euphemism for 
'disposition.' The evidence [of a prior offense 
was] not admissible.
Id. at 89.
Likewise, because Mr. Balcom's identity and intent were not
disputed issues, evidence of a common scheme or plan was
immaterial and therefore inadmissible.
Moreover, a striking similarity between the uncharged
offense and the charged offense is considered immaterial
when identity is not a disputed issue. Tassell 36 Cal. 3d
at 85. The Court in Tassell referred to People v. Inq, 65
Cal. 2d 603 (1967) and concluded that it had improperly
admitted evidence of prior crimes on the common scheme or
plan theory because identity was not at issue and there was
no evidence of a grand conception or plot. lAs.
B. The trial court improperly admitted evidence of 
the prior rape coBvietlon because euch evidence
wee not relevant to prove that Mr- Balcom
fiftMiiiitted the charged offense.
Even if intent had been a disputed issue, Mr. Balcom's 
state of mind in the Michigan offense was not relevant to 
prove his state of mind in the charged offense. In 
determining whether the uncharged crime is relevant to prove
15
a material fact, this Court stated:
[T]he court must first determine whether or not 
the uncharged offense serves 'logically, 
naturally, and by reasonable inference' to 
establish that fact. The court . . . 'must 
— examine the precise elements of similarity between 
the offenses with respect to the issue for which 
the evidence is proffered and satisfy itself that 
each link of the chain of inference between the 
former and the latter is reasonably strong.'
Thompson, 27 Cal- 3d at 316 (citations and footnote
omitted). The trial court should exclude the evidence of an
uncharged offense if its relation or connection to the
ultimate disputed fact is uncertain. Id. at 316.
In this case, evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape
conviction should have been excluded regardless of whether
this Court concludes that his intent was at issue. If this
Court concludes that Mr. Balcom's intent was not at issue,
the evidence should have been excluded because it was not
relevant to the only disputed issue of whether Ms. B.
consented. And if this Court concludes that Mr. Balcom's
intent was at issue, the evidence still should have been
excluded because it was not relevant to the issue of Mr.
Balcom's intent in this case. Either way, evidence of Mr.
Balcom's prior rape conviction was not admissible.
1. Evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape
conviction was not relevant to the issue of 
whether Ms. B. consented to sexual 
intercourse.
Evidence of Ms. H.'s lack of consent in the Michigan 
offense had no tendency to prove or disprove whether Ms. B. 
consented to sexual intercourse. The Michigan offense was
16
an entirely different incident involving a different woman. 
The evidence merely established the improper inference that 
Mr. Balcom had a disposition to commit the crime of rape. 
Therefore, evidence of the Michigan offense was irrelevant 
to the ultimate fact of Ms. B.'s consent.
2. The uncharged offense was not relevant to the 
issue of Mr. Balcom's intent in the charged 
offense because the dissimilarities between 
the two offenses had no tendency to show the 
existence of a common scheme or plan.
Evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction was 
improperly admitted to show a common scheme or plan. 
Evidence of a prior conviction is admissible under the 
common design or plan exception only if it shows: (l) a 
distinctive method of committing a particular type of crime 
(also called modus operand!), or (2) that the charged crime 
is an integral part of a larger scheme or conspiracy.
People v._ Thomas. 20 Cal. 3d at 464-65. In the present 
case, there was no evidence of either a distinctive method 
or a grand conspiracy.
This Court has stated that evidence is admissible only 
if "the other offenses . . . are sufficiently similar and 
possess a sufficiently high degree of common features with 
the act charged [so that] they warrant the inference that if 
the defendant committed the other acts he committed the act 
charged." People _v^_ Cramer, 67 Cal. 2d 126, 129-30 (1967). 
It is improper to consider only a "truncated portion" of the 
uncharged and charged incidents in determining whether there
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are substantial similarities. Thompson. 27 Cal. 3d at 321, 
n.24. In the present case, after a thorough comparison of 
the two incidents in their entirety, the vast 
dissimilarities between the uncharged incident and the 
incident in question were apparent.
The uncharged offense not only took place in a 
different state (Michigan), but occurred in the victim's car 
in an isolated area. (R.T. 1187-88). The charged offense 
occurred in Ms. B.'s home. (R.T. 785). The Michigan 
offense occurred in the early morning hours (R.T. 1184) 
while the charged offense occurred shortly after midnight 
- (R.T. 1129). In the Michigan offense, there was an oral 
copulation request but here there was no such request.
(R.T. 1189). Also, Ms. B. was left bound and gagged (R.T. 
797) while the victim in the Michigan offense was dropped 
off at a particular location (R.T. 1192). Finally, it was 
alleged that a rifle was used during the charged offense 
(R.T. 773) while it was established that a handgun was used 
in the Michigan offense (R.T. 1187).
Evidence of prior rape convictions has been admitted to 
show a common scheme or plan when identity was not an issue, 
but only where there was a striking similarity between the 
offenses. Matthews v; Superior Court. 201 Cal. App. 3d 385, 
395-96 (1988). The defendant in Matthews had two prior 
convictions, both similar to the charged offense in that he 
picked up a woman on Sunset Strip, drove her to a specific
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canyon, bound her, ripped her clothes, and raped her. 
Matthews, 201 Cal. App. 3d at 394. Matthews distinguished 
Tassell and concluded that the three incidents were 
"strikingly similar and revealed a plan to use deceptive 
means in bringing young women to a particular site to rape 
them in a distinctive way. Id. at 395. The court also 
stated that, "The design plan principle . . . requires that 
the former act or acts should indicate, by common features, 
a plan or design which tends to show that it was carried out 
by doing the act charged." at 396. However, in the
present case, the only similarities between the charged and 
uncharged offenses were that Mr. Balcom was wearing a 
baseball cap, and he took the women's cars and ATM cards. 
(R.T. 773-92, 1183-92) .
The few similarities between the uncharged and the 
charged offense did not involve distinctive characteristics 
and did not tend logically or reasonably to prove that if 
Mr. Balcom committed the Michigan offense, he must have 
raped Ms. B. There was no striking similarity between the 
offenses. Therefore, the evidence of the Michigan offense 
was not relevant to show the existence of a common scheme or 
plan.
C. Policy considerations also supported the
exclusion of evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior
rape conviction.
Evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction should 
have been excluded not only for lack of relevance and
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materiality, but also for policy reasons. Evidence that is 
not relevant to a material fact other than the defendant's 
criminal disposition is inadmissible because it "produces an 
'^er-strong tendency to believe the defendant guilty of the 
charge merely because he is a likely person to do such 
acts.'" Thompson. 27 Cal. 3d at 317 (citations omitted). 
This Court stated that, "[T]he risk of convicting the 
innocent [due to highly inflammatory evidence] ... is 
sufficiently imminent for us to forego the slight marginal 
gain in punishing the guilty." Schader, 71 Cal. 2d at 772- 
73.
In this case, there was substantial danger of the jury 
concluding that because Mr. Balcom raped Ms. H. he must have 
raped Ms, B. Evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction 
served no purpose whatsoever other than to show Mr. Balcom's 
disposition to commit rape. -Therefore, the evidence should 
have been excluded.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF MR.
BALCOM'8 PRIOR RAPE CONVICTION BECAUSE ITS PREJUDICIAL
EFFECT SUBSTANTIALLY OUTWEIGHED ANY POSSIBLE PROBATIVE
VALUE IT MAY HAVE HAD.
Even if the evidence of Mr. Balcom's, prior rape 
conviction was not completely barred by section 1101, the 
trial court abused its discretion by admitting the evidence 
because its prejudicial effect substantially outweighed any 
possible probative value it may have had.
In determining the admissibility of evidence, courts 
must engage in a balancing test and consider not only the
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probative value of such evidence, but also its prejudicial
effect. Section 352 of the California Evidence Code states,
The court in its discretion may exclude 
evidence if its probative value is
__ substantially outweighed by the probability _
that its admission will (a) necessitate undue 
consumption of time or (b) create substantial 
danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the 
issues, or of misleading the jury.
Cal. Evid. Code S 352 (West 1966). In other words, evidence
is not admissible if its prejudicial effect substantially
outweighs its probative value.
In this case, evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape 
conviction had no substantial probative value. Yet it was 
highly inflammatory and severely prejudicial. Therefore, 
the evidence should have been excluded.
A. Evidence of Mr* Balcom's prior rape conviction had
no substantial probative value.
Although probative value is not subject to quantitative 
measurement, this Court has identified some guidelines to be 
used in applying the balancing test required by section 352. 
Probative value consists of three elements: (1) relevance,
(2) materiality, and (3) necessity. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d at 
774. In addition, ”[s]ince 'substantial prejudicial effect 
is inherent in [evidence of uncharged offenses],' uncharged 
offenses are admissible only if they have substantial 
probative value. If there is any doubt, the evidence should 
be excluded." Thompson. 27 Cal. 3d at 318 (citations 
omitted). In this case, evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape 
conviction had no substantial probative value. Therefore,
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the evidence should have been excluded.
Even if the Court were to conclude that the evidence 
was either relevant or material under section 1101, the 
evidence should have been excluded because its probat^e 
value was, at best, only minimal. In order for evidence of 
other crimes to be deemed sufficiently probative to outweigh 
its prejudicial effect, the evidence must be necessary, 
schader, 71 Cal. 2d at 774. In other words, if the evidence 
is "merely cumulative with respect to other evidence which 
the People may use to prove the same issue” then the 
evidence must be excluded. Id.
In this case, evidence of Mr, Balcom's prior rape 
conviction was not necessary. The evidence was admitted to 
prove Mr. Balcom's intent and a common scheme or plan, a 
theory often used to show identity. However, Mr, Balcom's 
intent and identity were not in dispute because they had 
already been established without the use of the Michigan 
evidence. The prosecution established them both through Mr. 
Balcom's own testimony. Mr. Balcom testified that he 
intended to have sexual intercourse with Ms. B. This was 
the only aspect of his intent which the prosecution needed 
to prove because Mr. Balcom only argued actual consent at 
trial.® Moreover, Mr. Balcom admitted that he was the man
®As explained above, the defense of actual consent requires 
the jury to decide which of the two witnesses is telling the 
truth. It does not ask the jury to determine the defendant's 
state of mind. Romero, 117 Cal, App. 3d at 1155.
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who went to Ms. B.'s apartment on the evening in question 
and that he was the man who had sexual intercourse with her. 
Therefore, evidence of the Michigan offense as admitted to 
establish Mr. Balcom's intent or identity, was cumulative, 
unnecessary, and should have been excluded.
In sum, evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction 
had no substantial probative value. The evidence was 
probably irrelevant, immaterial, and unnecessary. However, 
even if the court finds that the evidence had some probative 
value, it was not substantial and therefore it should have 
been excluded. Thompson, 27 Cal. 3d at 318.
B. The prejudicial effect of admitting_evidence of 
Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction substantially
outweighed anv probative value the evidence may 
have had*
Prejudicial effect, like probative value, is not 
subject to quantitative measurement. Schader, 71 Cal. 2d at 
774. It must be determined by examining the specific 
evidence sought to be admitted in the context of the 
particular case. However, it is clear that in general, 
”[t]he admission of any evidence that involves crimes other 
than those for which a defendant is being tried has a 
'highly inflammatory and prejudicial effect' on the trier of 
fact . . . [and therefore] must be 'scrutinized with great 
care.'" Thompson. 27 Cal. 3d at 314.
Dean Wigmore explained that one of the main reasons why 
evidence of other crimes is prejudicial and therefore often 
inadmissible is "the overstrong tendency to believe the
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accused guilty of the charge merely because he is a likely 
person to do such acts . . . lA Wigmore, Evidence S 
58.2, at 1215.
__ In this case, evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior ra^
conviction was extremely prejudicial for two reasons.
First, it had a highly inflammatory effect on the jury's 
emotions. At trial, the jury was allowed to hear and see 
the live testimony of Ms. H., the victim of the Michigan 
offense. Ms. H. sat in front of the jury and specifically 
described the details of the torment she experienced at the 
hands of Mr. Balcom. She explained how he aimed a gun at 
- her head, shoved her, and took control of her car. (R.T. 
1186-87). She described the specific gun he used. (R.T. 
1187). She told how he drove her around until finally 
parking on a deserted dirt road. (TtL.). She described how 
he tore her clothes off while pointing the gun at her face. 
(R.T. 1188). She described how he forced her to have sexual 
intercourse and how long it lasted. (R.T. 1188-89). She 
also described how he asked her to perform oral sex. (R.T. 
1189). Throughout her entire testimony, the jury could see 
her face, hear the fear in her voice, and vicariously 
experience all of her emotions. She cried while describing 
the torment of these events and the jury, being only human, 
could not help but feel sorry for her.
Allowing Ms. H. to testify in front of the jury as to 
the specifics of the Michigan offense was clearly
24
prejudicial. Yet the respondent contends that it was not 
prejudicial because even if she had not testified, the jury 
still would have heard about Mr. Balcom's prior conviction 
because a sanitized version of the offense would hav^ been 
admissible in order to impeach Mr. Balcom's testimony. 
However, admitting a sanitized version of Mr. Balcom's prior 
offense is entirely different than allowing the jury to hear 
Ms. H.'s testimony. A sanitized version simply consists of 
asking Mr. Balcom, "Have you ever been convicted of a sexual 
assault?" It does not allow the jury to hear the specifics 
of the prior offense. On the other hand, Ms. H.'s live, 
specific, emotional testimony prejudicially affected the 
jury's emotions especially since Ms. B. herself was so 
unemotional. Had the jury only heard Ms. B.'s unemotional 
testimony it is highly likely that their sympathy for her 
would not have been as strong.
Second, the evidence was unduly prejudicial because of 
the implications it created about Mr. Balcom's character.
The live testimony of Ms. H. showed the jury that Mr. Balcom 
was a rapist. It showed them that he used force and guns to 
get what he wanted. And it showed them the powerful effect 
of his actions on an emotional victim. The jury was 
therefore able to infer that because he raped once, he must 
have raped this time. In addition, even if he did not rape 
this time, he deserved to be punished because he raped in 
the past. This is exactly why Dean Wigmore stated that
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evidence of other crimes is prejudicial and often should be 
excluded. lA Wigmore, Evidence S 58.2, at 1215.
Hearing and seeing an emotional victim testify as to 
the-events of the prior offense vastly increased the _ 
likelihood that the jury improperly inferred that because 
Mr. Balcom had a "bad character," he must be guilty of the 
charged offense. Merely admitting a sanitized version of 
the prior offense does not disclose the specifics of Mr. 
Balcom's prior conduct and therefore, is not as likely to 
result in an improper inference by the jury.
In balancing the prejudicial effect of this evidence 
against its probative value, it is clear that the evidence 
should have been excluded. As this Court explained in 
Thompson. "Since 'substantial prejudicial effect is inherent 
in [evidence of uncharged offenses],' uncharged offenses are 
admissible only if they have .substantial probative value.
If there is any doubt, the evidence should be excluded." 
Thompson. 27 Cal. 3d at 318 (citations omitted). In this 
case, the evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction had 
no substantial probative value. Moreover, the evidence was 
highly inflammatory and severely prejudicial. If the trial 
court had any doubt whatsoever as to the extent of the 
probative value of the Michigan offense, the doubt should 
have been resolved in Mr. Balcom's favor. Therefore, under 
the balancing test of section 352, the evidence should have 
been excluded.
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III. ADMITTING EVIDENCE OP NR. BALCOM'8 PRIOR RAPE
CONVICTION WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
This case must be reversed because the trial court's 
error in admitting evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape 
conviction resulted in a "miscarriage of justice." Cal, 
Const., art. VI, sec, 13. *'[A] 'miscarriage of justice'
should be declared only when the court, 'after an 
examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' is 
of the 'opinion' that it is reasonably probable that a 
result more favorable to the appealing party would have been 
reached in the absence of the error." People v. Watson. 46 
Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1956). In this case, it is reasonably 
probable that a result more favorable to Mr. Balcom would 
have been reached had the trial court not erroneously 
admitted the evidence.
There are four factors which, when considered together, 
prove that the evidence was not merely harmless. First, 
this was a close case. Had the evidence of Mr. Balcom's 
prior rape conviction not been admitted, the jury could have 
easily decided the case the other way. The jury was 
presented with conflicting testimony from Mr. Balcom and Ms. 
B. and it was up to them to decide who was telling the 
truth.
According to Mr. Balcom's testimony, he and Ms, B. had 
known each before the night in question, (R.T. 1110-30).
The reason he went to her apartment that night was to 
collect some money her roommate owed him, (R.T. 1127-28).
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Ms. B. invited him in and told him that her roommate would 
be back soon. (R.T. 1130). Their conversation became 
intimate and "led to" Ms. B.'s bedroom where they engaged in 
consensual sexual intercourse. fid.). Afterwards, he 
realized that Ms. B. had lied to him and that in fact her 
roommate was not going to pay him. (R.T. 1131). Thinking 
that she and her roommate were "in [it] together," Mr.
Balcom took Ms. B.'s ATM card in order to collect his money. 
(R.T. 1131-36). Mr. Balcom denied that he raped her. (R.T. 
1140).
Ms. B.'S testimony, on the other hand, was entirely 
different. If Ms. H.'s testimony had not been admitted the 
jury, in deciding who was telling the truth, could have 
easily accepted Mr. Balcom's theory of the case. Ms. B. 
claimed that she had never seen Mr. Balcom before the night 
in question. (R.T- 764-71). However, Ms. Ray, a security 
guard who worked at the apartment complex where Ms. B. 
lived, testified that prior to the day of the alleged 
incident she had seen Mr. Balcom in the complex and she had 
even seen Mr. Balcom enter Ms. B.'s apartment. (R.T. 1042- 
46).
Ms. B. also claimed that Mr. Balcom had a gun and that 
he forced himself into her apartment. (R.T. 773-90). The 
prosecution attempted to corroborate Ms. B.'s claim by 
introducing the testimony of Michael Baker, a witness who 
was in the apartment complex on the night in question.
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(R.T. 1007). Mr. Baker stated that around 2 a.m. that night 
he saw a black man in the complex carrying a long object 
covered by a towel. (R.T. 1007-10). He said he thought 
that the long object resembled a gun. (R.T. 1012).^
However, Mr. Baker never got a look at this mystery-black- 
man's face and could not even determine whether the man had 
dark black skin or light black skin. (R.T. 1014, 1017). In 
addition, Mr. Baker testified that the man with the long 
object was wearing a sweat shirt (R.T. 1018) while Ms. B. 
testified that Mr. Balcom was wearing a T-shirt (R.T. 777). 
Ms. Ray also testified that there were always many people 
coming and going in the apartment complex between 7 p.m. and 
2 a.m, (R.T. 1035-38). Merely because Mr. Baker saw "a" 
black man, does not necessarily mean that black man was Mr. 
Balcom. The man Mr. Baker observed could have been anyone.
Another contradiction which shows that without Ms. H.'s 
testimony the jury could have easily reached a different 
result, is the issue of Ms. B.'s car. Ms. B. testified that 
when Mr. Balcom stole her car keys she never told him 
exactly where her car was parked. (R.T. 792). However, Ms. 
Ray testified that it would have been impossible to locate 
Ms. B.'s car without being told exactly where it was parked 
because there are so many parking stalls in the complex and 
there is no correlation between a tenant's apartment number 
and their parking stall. (R.T. 1040-41). Mr. Hariri, the 
property manager, also testified that when he asked Ms. B.
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how her alleged attacker located her car, she did not have 
an answer for him. (R.T. 1072).
Based on the fact that Ms. B.'s testimony was directly 
contradicted by other witnesses, it seems reasonable_that 
the jury could have decided the case the other way. The 
erroneous admission of Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction 
prejudicially tipped the scale in favor of Ms. B. and 
therefore constituted reversible error.
This case is substantially similar to Thomas in 
which this Court held that the trial court committed 
reversible error by admitting the testimony of the 
* defendant's daughter, *'C”, who stated that the defendant had 
committed lewd acts against her as a child. This Court 
stated.
The case presented essentially a credibility 
determination for the jury, and the evidence, 
although strong, was not overwhelmingly 
against defendant's version of events. But 
for C's incriminating testimony, the jury 
might .well have accepted defendant's theory 
that C had convinced [the prosecuting 
witnesses] to fabricate their stories.
Thomas. 20 Cal. 3d at 470 (citations omitted).
The present case also involved a credibility
determination and "but for” the admission of the evidence of
the Michigan offense, the jury might well have accepted Mr.
Balcom's theory of the case. Therefore, the erroneous
admission was reversible error. Had the evidence not been
admitted, the jury could have easily reached a different
result.
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This case is, however, distinguishable from Tassell.
In Tassell. this Court held that the erroneous admission of 
evidence of the defendant's prior sex offenses was harmless 
and did not require reversal because, "there was compelling 
corroboration of the victim's testimony but not of the 
defendant's story." Tassell. 36 Cal. 3d at 89. This case 
is distinguishable from Tassell because here, there was no 
more corroboration of Ms. B.'s testimony than there was of 
Mr. Balcom's. In fact, there was extensive corroboration of 
Mr. Balcom's testimony by Ms. Ray, Mr. Baker, and Mr.
Hariri, all of which directly contradicted Ms. B.'s story. 
Therefore, the jury could have decided the case the other 
way.
A second factor which shows that the erroneous 
admission constituted reversible error was the fact that the 
admission had an unduly prejudicial effect on the jury. As 
explained above, the jury was allowed to hear the live 
testimony of Ms. H., the victim of the Michigan offense.
The jury saw the tears on her face, heard the fear in her 
voice, and vicariously experienced all of her emotions. The 
effect of such detailed, live testimony was much more 
prejudicial than simply hearing a sanitized statement that 
Mr. Balcom had previously been convicted of a sexual 
assault. The sanitized version, which would have been 
admitted to impeach Mr. Balcom's testimony, would have 
carried very little prejudice because it would not have
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included the specifics of the prior offense. However, 
hearing Ms. H. cry on the stand was entirely different. It 
carried a tremendous amount of prejudice and must have had a 
substantial impact on the jury, especially since Ms. B. 
herself was so unemotional.
Third, the erroneous admission constituted reversible
error regardless of the fact that the jury was instructed
only to consider the evidence for the limited purpose of
determining intent and identity and not to infer that Mr-
Balcom was a person of "bad character.” (R.T. 1349-51). It
would be unrealistic to assume that the jury was able to
completely separate the two purposes. Granted, "the general
rule is that on appeal we must assume the jury followed the
court's instructions and admonitions." People v. Frank. 51
Cal. 3d 718, 727 (1990). However, as the Court of Appeal
stated in People v. Gibson.
It is the essence of sophistry and lack of 
realism to think that an instruction or 
admonition to a jury to limit its 
consideration of highly prejudicial evidence 
to its limited relevant purpose can have any 
realistic effect. It is time that we face 
the realism of jury trials and recognize that 
jurors are mere mortals. Of what value are 
the declarations of legal principles with 
respect to the admissibility of other-crimes 
evidence ... if we permit the violation of 
such principles in their practical 
application? We live in a dream world if we 
believe that jurors are capable of hearing 
such prejudicial evidence but not applying it 
in an improper manner.
People V. Gibson. 56 Cal. App. 3d 119, 129 (1976).
Therefore regardless of the jury's instructions, the
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erroneous admission of the evidence was reversible error.
Finally, there is empirical data proving that the 
erroneous admission constituted reversible error. At Mr. 
Balcom's first trial when Ms. H.'s live, emotional testimony 
was not admitted, the jury was hung and did not convict Mr. 
Balcom of rape. (C.T. 146-47). However at Mr. Balcom's 
retrial when Ms. H.'s testimony was admitted, the jury 
convicted Mr. Balcom of rape. (C.T. 229-30). The trial and 
the retrial were substantially similar. Granted the first 
trial did not include Mr. Baker's testimony. However, Mr. 
Baker's testimony added nothing to the prosecution's case.
As explained above, Mr. Baker could not identify the man he 
saw. (R.T. 1014). He could not even determine whether the 
man had dark black skin or light black skin. (R.T. 1017).
In fact, Mr. Baker's testimony conflicted with Ms. B.'s 
testimony because Ms. B. claimed that Mr. Balcom was wearing 
a T-shirt (R.T. 777) and Mr. Baker testified that the man he 
saw was wearing a sweat shirt (R.T. 1018).
A similar course of events took place in Kellev in 
which this Court held that the trial court committed 
reversible error by admitting evidence of the defendant's 
uncharged offenses. Kelley. 66 Cal. 2d at 245. This Court 
stated that, ”[A]t the first trial when such evidence was 
excluded the jury was unable to agree but at this trial when 
the evidence was admitted a unanimous verdict resulted. The 
two trials being otherwise substantially similar, such fact
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demons'tra'tes almos't to a certainty the prejudicial nature of 
the error." Id.
In this case, Mr. Balcom's trial and retrial were also 
substantially similar. Therefore, as in Kellev, the jEact 
that the first trial resulted in a hung jury and the second 
trial resulted in a conviction, shows "almost to a 
certainty" that the error was prejudicial.
In sum, based on the fact that this case involved a 
substantial amount of conflicting testimony, it seems 
"reasonably probable" that without the error, a different 
outcome would have been reached. Jurors are only human, and 
the empirical data that we have in this case shows that 
without Ms. H.'s testimony the jury could have easily 
reached a different result. Therefore, under the Watson 
test, the trial court committed reversible error by 
admitting the evidence of Mr. Balcom's prior rape 
conviction.
C0MCLU8I0M
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of Mr. 
Balcom's prior rape conviction because the evidence was not 
relevant to show either his intent or a common scheme or 
plan. Mr. Balcom merely asserted the defense of actual 
consent and therefore did not place his state of mind or 
identity in issue.
Additionally, the trial court erred in admitting the
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evidence because its prejudicial effect substantially 
outweighed any possible probative value it may have had.
Finally, the trial court's error was reversible error 
because it resulted in a miscarriage of justice. ^
Therefore, for the reasons stated above, Petitioner 
respectfully requests that the decision of the trial court 
be reversed and that a new trial be granted with specific 
instructions not to admit the unduly prejudicial evidence of 
Mr. Balcom's prior rape conviction.
Dated:
